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Abstract
We study the relationship between the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations and
the ex-post core of exchange economies with asymmetric information. © 2000 Elsevier Science
S.A. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The core of an exchange economy with complete information and its relationship to
competitive allocations has been studied extensively in the literature (for a comprehensive
survey, see Anderson, 1992). For economies with asymmetric information, several alter-
native notions of core had been proposed (e.g., Wilson, 1978; Kobayashi, 1980; Yannelis,
1991; Koutsougeras and Yannelis, 1993; Allen, 1997). In this paper, we study the relation-
ship between the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations and the ex-post core
(i.e., the set of allocations which ex-post cannot be improved upon by any coalition) of an
economy with asymmetric information.
We consider an exchange economy with asymmetric information in which the space
of traders is a measure space, and the set of states of nature is finite. Our framework is
closely related to that of Allen (e.g., Allen, 1981, 1986). In studies of rational expectations
equilibria, it is common to appeal to an artificial family of complete information economies
associated with the original economy; see, e.g., Grossman (1978, 1981), Radner (1979,
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1982), Allen (1981, 1982). We show that the ex-post core consists of all the selections
from the core correspondence of the associated family of complete information economies.
Consequently, every rational expectations equilibrium allocation corresponding to fully
revealing equilibrium prices is in the ex-post core of the economy. This need not be the case
when equilibrium prices are not fully revealing (see Example 4.2).
We also prove that when the utility function of every trader is measurable with respect
to his information field (that is, when every trader knows his utility function), the set of
rational expectations equilibrium allocations consists of all selections from the competitive
equilibrium correspondence of the associated family of complete information economies.
This result and the representation result for the ex-post core imply, using Aumann’s Core
Equivalence Theorem, see Aumann, 1964, that if the economy is atomless and the utility
function of each trader is measurable with respect to his information field, then the set of
rational expectations equilibrium allocations coincides with the ex-post core. We also show
that when the utility function of each trader is measurable with respect to his information
field, then an analog of Debreu-Scarf’s Theorem, see Debreu and Scarf (1963), holds for
rational expectations equilibrium and ex-post core allocations.
2. The model
We consider a pure exchange economy E with differential information. The space of the
traders is a measure space (T,  , ), where T is a set (set of traders),  is a  -field of the
subsets of T (the set of coalitions), and  is a measure on  . The commodity space isRlC.
The space of states of nature is a measurable space (Ω , F), where Ω is a finite set and F
is a field of subsets of Ω .
Traders do not necessarily know which state of nature !2Ω actually occurred, although
they know their own endowments, and may also have some additional information about the
state of nature. We assume that the information of a trader t2T is described by a measurable
partition t of Ω . We denote byF t the field generated by t . If !0 is the true state of nature,
trader t observes the member of t which contains !0. Every trader t2T has a probability
measure qt onF , which represents his prior beliefs. For simplicity, it is assumed that if A2F
is a non-empty set, then qt (A)>0 for all t2T. The preferences of a trader t2T are represented
by a state-dependent utility function, ut : Ω RlC ! R such that for every x 2 RlC, the
function ut (, x) is F-measurable. It is also assumed that for every .t; x/ 2 T  RlC, the
mapping (t, x)!ut (!, x) is B-measurable, where ! is a fixed member of Ω , and B is
the  -field of Borel subsets ofRlC. Traders’ initial endowments are described by a function
e: Ω  T ! RlC such that for every !2Ω , e(!, ) is -integrable on T; e(!, t) represents
the initial endowment of trader t2T in the state of nature !2Ω .
Since Ω is finite, there is a finite subfamily .Fi /niD1 of (F t )t2T such that for every t2T,
there is 1in with F tDF i . We assume that for all 1in, the set TiDft2TjF tDF ig is
measurable and (Ti)>0. We also assume that FD
Wn
iD1F i , which means that F contains
no superfluous events about which no trader has information, and therefore cannot affect
anyone’s consumption decisions.
We use the following notations. For two vectors xD(x1, : : : , xl) and yD(x1, : : : , xl) in
Rl , we write xy when xk>yk for all 1kl, xy when xy and x6Dy, and xy when xk>yk
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for all 1kl. A function u: RlC ! R is (strictly) increasing if for all x, y 2 RlC,
(x>y) xy implies u(x)>u(y); it is quasi concave if for all x, y 2 RlC and 2[0,1],
u(xC(1−)y)minfu(x), u(y)g; and it is strictly quasi concave if for all x, y 2 RlC,
x6Dy, and 2(0,1), u(xC(1−)y)>minfu(x),u(y)g.
Throughout the paper, we will often refer to the following conditions.
(A.1). For every !2Ω , R
T
e(!, t)d0.
(A.2). For every t2T, the function e(, t) is F t -measurable.
(A.3). For every x 2 RlC and t2T, the function ut (, x) is F t -measurable.
(A.4). For every t2T and !2Ω , the function ut (!, ) is continuous, strictly increasing, and
quasi concave onRlC.
(A.5). For every t2T and !2Ω , the function ut (!, ) is continuous, increasing, and strictly
quasi concave onRlC.
Imposing (A.1) guarantees that at every state of nature every commodity is present in the
market. (A.2) and (A.3) require that each agent knows, respectively, his (state dependent)
initial endowments and utility function. Finally, (A.4) and (A.5) impose properties on the
traders utility functions. (Note that (A.5) implies (A.4)).
In the rest of the paper, an economy E is an economy with asymmetric information as
described above. For an economy E and a state of nature !2Ω , we denote by E(!) the
complete information economy in which the commodity space is RlC, the space of the
traders is (T,  , ), and for every trader t2T, his initial endowment is e(!, t) and his utility
function is ut (!, ); also, we write C(E(!)) for the core of E(!).
3. The ex-post core
In this section we define the ex-post core of an economy E , and we show that under (A.1)
and (A.4), it is a non-empty set. Furthermore, the ex-post core of an economy E consists
of all the selections from the core correspondence of the associated family of complete
information economies fE(!)g!2Ω .
Let E be an economy. An assignment is a function x : Ω  T ! RlC such that for every
!2Ω , the function x (!, ) is -integrable on T, and for every t2T, the function x (, t) is
F-measurable. An allocation is an assignment x such that
R
T
x(!, t)dR
T
e(!, t)d for
every !2Ω . Let x be an allocation, let S2 be a coalition, and let !02Ω; we say that an
assignment y is an ex-post improvement of S upon x at !0 if
(3.1) (S)>0,
(3.2) R
S
y (!0, t)d
R
S
e(!0, t)d, and
(3.3) ut (!0, y(!0, t))>ut (!0, x(!0, t)) for almost all t2S.
An allocation x is an ex-post core allocation if no coalition S2 has an ex-post improve-
ment upon x at any !2Ω . The ex-post core of E , denoted by C(E), is the set of all the
ex-post core allocations of E .
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Theorem 3.1. If an economy E satisfies (A.1) and (A.3), then the ex-post core of E is
non-empty. Moreover, the ex-post core of E is
C.E/ D fx jx is an assignment and x.!; / 2 C.E.!// for all! 2 Ωg:
Proof. Let
X D fxjx is an assignment and x.!; / 2 C.E.!// for all ! 2 Ωg:
We first show that X6D;, and then we show that C(E)DX. It is well known that if (A.1)
and (A.3) are satisfied, then C(E(!))6D;, for all !2Ω (see, e.g., Aumann, 1964, 1966, and
Hildenbrand, 1968, 1974). Let A1, : : : , Ak be all the atoms of the fieldF . For every 1jk,
let !j2Aj and xj2C(E(!j )). Define x: ΩT ! RlC byx (!, t)Dxj (t), whenever !2Aj and
t2T. Then x is a well-defined assignment in E . Let 1jk and !2Aj . Then e(!, )De(!j ,),
and for all t2T, ut (!, )Dut (!j , ). Therefore, E(!)DE(!j ). Thus, x (!, )Dx (!j , ), which
implies that x(!,)2C(E(!)) for all !2Ω; hence, x2X and X6D;.
The proof that C(E)X is straightforward. We show that C(E)X. Let x2C(E) and as-
sume, contrary to our claim, that x =2X. Then there exists !02Ω such thatx (!0, )=2C(E(!0)).
Therefore, there exists a coalition S2 with (S)>0, and an integrable function y: T ! RlC
such that
R
S
y(t)dR
S
e(!0, t)d and ut (!0, y (t))>ut (!0, x(!0, t)) for almost all t2S. Let
A(!0) be the atom of the field F containing !0. Define a function z: Ω  T ! RlC by
z.!; t/ D

y.t/ if ! 2 A.!0/
e.!; t/ otherwise:
Then z is an assignment in E . Moreover, z is an ex-post improvement of S upon x at !0,
which contradicts that x2C(E). 
4. Rational expectations equilibria and the ex-post core
In this section we study the relation between the ex-post core and the set of rational
expectations equilibrium allocations.
Let E be an economy. If G is a subfield of F , f: Ω!RC is an F-measurable function,
and t2T, we denote by Et (fjG) the conditional expectation of f with respect to qt . A price
system is anF-measurable non-zero function p: Ω ! RlC. If p is a price system, we denote
by  (p) the smallest subfield G of F for which p is G-measurable. Note that the atoms of
 (p) are the elements of the partition of Ω generated by the function p. The budget set of a
trader t2T at the state of nature !2Ω when the price system is p is given by
Bt.!; p/ D fa 2 RlCj p.!/a  p.!/e.!; t/g:
A rational expectations equilibrium is a pair (p, x), where p is a price system and x is an
allocation such that
(4.1) for almost all t2T, x(, t) is  (p) _F t -measurable;
(4.2) for every !2Ω and almost all t2T, x(!, t)2Bt (!, p); and
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(4.3) for almost all t2T, if y : Ω ! RlC is  (p) _F t -measurable and satisfies y(!)2Bt (!,
p) for all !2Ω , then
Et.ut .; x.; t//j.p/ _ Ft /  Et.ut .; x.//j.p/ _ Ft /;
pointwise on Ω .
A rational expectations equilibrium (p, x ) is fully revealing if  (p)DF .
Proposition 4.1. Let E be an economy, and let (p, x) be a fully revealing rational expecta-
tions equilibrium for E . Then x is an ex-post core allocation of E .
Proof. Let E be an economy, and let (p, x) be a fully revealing rational expectations equi-
librium for E . Then  (p)DF . Since for every assignment z we have
Et.ut .; z.; t//j.p/ _ Ft / D ut .; z.; t//;
for all t2T, the proof thatx2C(E) is completely analogous to the proof that every competitive
allocation of a complete information economy is in the core. 
The following example shows that there are rational expectations equilibrium allocations
that are neither fully revealing nor ex-post core allocations.
Example 4.2. Consider an economy E in which the set of traders is TDf1, 2g, the commod-
ity space isR2C, the space of states of nature is ΩDf!1, !2g, andFD2Ω . The traders have a
common prior qD(1/2, 1/2). The information partition of Trader 1 is 1Dff!1, !2gg, and
that of Trader 2 is 2Dff!1g, f!2gg. Their initial endowments are e(!1, 1)De(!2, 1)D(2,
4) and e(!1, 2)De(!2, 2)D(4, 2), and their utility functions are u1(!1, (x, y))Dpx C 2py,
u1(!2, (x, y))D2px C py and u2(!1, (x, y))Du2(!1, (x, y))D
p
x C py, respectively. Let p
be the price system given by p(!)D(1, 1) for all !2Ω , and define the allocation x by x(!,
t)D(3, 3) for all (!, t)2ΩT. It is easy to check that (p, x) is a rational expectations equilib-
rium for E , and since  (p)Df0, f!1, !2gg, it is not a fully revealing rational expectations
equilibrium. The allocation x, however, is not an ex-post core allocation of E . Indeed, the
initial assignment e satisfies
u1.!1; e.!1; 1// D
p
2 C 4 > 3
p
3 D u1.!1; x.!1; 1//;
so that Trader 1 blocks x.
There are examples in the literature of economies satisfying the conditions of Theorem
3.1, but which do not have any rational expectations equilibrium — see, e.g., Kreps (1977),
and Allen (1986). Therefore, in these economies, there are ex-post core allocations, which
are not rational expectations equilibrium allocations.
Note that in Example 4.2 the utility function of Trader 1 is not measurable with respect
to his information field. As we shall see, when each trader knows his state-dependent
utility function (i.e., when each trader’s utility function is measurable with respect to his
information field), every rational expectations equilibrium allocation is an ex-post core
allocation.
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Given an economy E , we denote by RE(E) the set of rational expectations equilibrium
allocations of E , and for !2Ω , we write W(E(!)) for the set of competitive allocations of
E(!).
Theorem 4.3. If an economy Esatisfies (A.1)–(A.3), and (A.5), then
RE.E/ D fxjx is an assignment and x.!; / 2 W.E.!// for all ! 2 Ωg:
Proof. Let
Y D fxjx is an assignment and x.!; / 2 W.E.!// for all ! 2 Ωg:
We first prove that RE(E)Y. Let x2RE(E). We show that x2Y. Let O!2Ω . We prove
that x ( O!,)2W(E( O!)). Let p be a price system such that (p, x) is a rational expectations
equilibrium of E . We show that (p( O!), x ( O!, )) is a competitive equilibrium of E( O!). Clearly,
x( O!, t)2Bt ( O!, p) for almost all t2T. We prove that x( O!, t) maximizes ut ( O!, ) on Bt ( O!, p)
for almost all t2T, which establishes that x( O!, )2W(E( O!)). Let S be the set of all t2T such
that (4.3) is satisfied for (p,x ). Then (S)D(T). Let t2S, and let a2Bt ( O!, p). Denote by
At ( O!) the atom of  (p)_F t containing O!. Define y: Ω ! RlC by
y.!/ D

a if ! 2 At. O!/
0 otherwise:
Then y is a  (p)_F t -measurable function. As p(!)Dp( O!) and e(!, t)De( O!, t) for all
!2At ( O!), we have y(!)2Bt (!, p) for all !2Ω . Since t2S, we have by (4.3)
Et.ut .; y.//j.p/ _ Ft /. O!/  Et.ut .; x.; t//j.p/ _ Ft /. O!/:
By (A.3)
Et.ut .; y.//j.p/ _ Ft / D ut .; y.//;
and
Et.ut .; x.; t//j.p/ _ Ft / D ut .; x.; t//:
Therefore
ut . O!; a/ D ut . O!; y. O!//  ut . O!; x. O!; t//:
Thus, x( O!, t) maximizes ut ( O!, ) on Bt ( O!, p) for all t2S. Since (S)D(T), we have
x( O!, )2W(E( O!)).
It remains to be shown that YRE(E). Let x2Y. Then x is an allocation in E , and for all
!2Ω , x(!, )2W(E(!)). Therefore, for each !2Ω , there is a p.!/ 2 RlC such that (p(!),
x(!, )) is a competitive equilibrium for E(!). Since for all t2T and !2Ω , the function
ut (!, ) is strictly increasing on RlC by (A.5), we have p(!)0, for all !2Ω . Let
A1, : : : , Ak be all the atoms of the fieldF . For every 1jk, let !j2Aj . Define the function
pˆ: Ω ! RlC by pˆ(!)Dp(!j ), whenever !2Aj . Then pˆ is F-measurable. We show that
(pˆ, x ) is a rational expectations equilibrium for E , and this will give x2RE(E). We first
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claim that for all !2Ω , (pˆ(!), x(!, )) is a competitive equilibrium for E(!). Let !2Ω;
then there exists 1jk and !j2Aj such that pˆ(!)Dp(!j ). Now (A.2) and (A.3) imply that
E(!)DE(!j ). Also, since x is an assignment, we have x(!, )Dx(!j , ). As (p(!j ), x(!j , ))
is a competitive equilibrium for E(!j ), we have (pˆ(!), x(!, )) is a competitive equilibrium
for E(!).
We now prove that for all t2T, x(, t) is  (pˆ)_F t -measurable, i.e., that x(, t) is constant
on the atoms of  (pˆ)_F t . Let t2T and let A be an atom of  (pˆ)_F t . Assume that !1, !22A;
then pˆ(!1)Dpˆ(!2). Since e(, t) is F t -measurable, we have e(!1, t)De(!2, t). Therefore,
Bt.!1; Op/ D Bt.!2; Op/: (4.6)
Now by (A.3), we have
ut .!1; / D ut .!2; /: (4.7)
Since (pˆ(!1), x(!1, )) and (pˆ(!2), x (!2, )) are competitive equilibria of E(!1) and
E(!2), respectively, by (4.6) and (4.7), x (!1, t) and x (!2, t) are maximizers of ut (!1, ) on
Bt (!1, pˆ). As ut (!1, ) is strictly quasi concave, it has a unique maximizer on Bt (!1, pˆ),
and thus x(!1, t)Dx(!2, t), which establishes that x(, t) is  (pˆ)_F t -measurable.
Since for all !2Ω , (pˆ(!), x(!, )) is a competitive equilibrium of E(!), we have
x(!, t)2Bt (!, pˆ) for all !2Ω and almost all t2T. Therefore (pˆ, x ) satisfies (4.2).
It remains to be shown that (pˆ, x) satisfies (4.3). For every !2Ω , let S(!) be the set of all
t2T such that x(!, t) maximizes ut (!, ) on Bt (!, pˆ). Then (S(!))D(T). Let SD\!2ΩS(!).
Then (S)D(T). Let t2S and let y : Ω ! RlC be a  (pˆ)_F t -measurable function such
that y(!)2Bt (!, pˆ) for all !2Ω . Then, for all !2Ω , we have ut (!, y(!))ut (!, x(!, t)),
and therefore
Et.ut .; y.//j. Op/ _ Ft /  Et.ut .; x.; t//j. Op/ _ Ft /
on Ω . Since this inequality holds for all t2S, (pˆ, x) satisfies (4.3). 
Corollary 4.4. If an economy Esatisfies (A.1)–(A.3), and (A.5), then every rational expec-
tations equilibrium allocation of E is in the ex-post core of E (i.e., RE(E)C(E)).
Proof. Since W(E(!))C(E(!)) for all !2Ω , Corollary 4.4 follows from Theorems 3.1
and 4.3. 
Theorem 4.5. Let Ebe an atomless economy (that is, such that the measure  on (T,) is
non-atomic) satisfying (A.1)–(A.3) and (A.5). Then, the set of rational expectations equi-
librium allocations of E coincides with the ex-post core of E(i.e., RE(E)DC(E)).
Proof. By Aumann’s Core-Equivalence Theorem, see Aumann (1964), for all !2Ω ,
W(E(!))DC(E(!)). Therefore, by Theorems 3.1 and 4.3, we have RE(E)DC(E). 
Let E be a finite economy, i.e., TDf1, : : : , ng, D2T , and  is the counting measure. The
k-fold replication of the economy E is an economy Ek in which the set of traders T k has nk
traders, the set of coalitions is the set of all subsets of T k, and also there is a partition of T k to
n disjoint sets T k1;: : : , T kn such that for every 1in, the traders in T ki have the same utility,
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the same initial endowment, the same information field, and the same priors. An allocation
xO in the economy Ek is an equal treatment allocation if it assigns the same random bundle
to traders in the same set T ki , 1in; that is, if t1, t22T ki for some 1in, then
Ox.!; t1/ D xO.!; t2/;
for all !2Ω . Let k be a natural number and let Ox be an equal treatment allocation in Ek .
For 1in, denote by Ox(, i) the random bundle that xO assigns to the traders in T ki . Define
the allocation x in E by x(!, t)DOx(!, i) whenever !2Ω and t2Ti . We call x the allocation
in E which corresponds to Ox . For every natural number k, we denote by C(Ek ) the set of all
allocations in E which corresponds to equal treatment ex-post core allocations in Ek–such
allocations exist by Theorem 3.1 and Debreu Scarf’s Theorem; see Debreu and Scarf (1963).
Theorem 4.6. Let Ebe an economy with a finite number of traders satisfying (A.1)–(A.4).
Then RE(E)DT1kD1C(Ek ).
Proof. Let !2Ω . For every natural number k denote by C(Ek (!)) the set of all core
allocations in E(!) which corresponds to equal treatment allocations in Ek (!). By the
Debreu-Scarf’s Theorem,
W.E.!// D
1\
kD1
C.Ek.!//:
Therefore, by Theorem 3.1, we obtain that
1\
kD1
C.Ek/ D fxj x is an assignment and x.!; / 2 W.E.!// for all ! 2 Ωg:
Hence, by Theorem 4.3, RE(E)DT1kD1C(Ek ). 
5. Concluding remarks
The ex-post core of an economy with asymmetric information does not depend on the
information structure of the economy. In some cases, however, the logical relation between
the ex-post core and the set of rational expectations equilibrium allocations of an economy,
and the relation of these sets with other solution concepts studied in the literature, does
depend on the information structure. Einy et al. (2000), for example, show that in an atomless
economy with asymmetric information, Wilson’s fine core is a subset of the ex-post core.
Thus, Theorem 4.5, which we view as the main result in the present paper, implies that
under assumptions (A.1)–(A.3) and (A.5), every allocation in Wilson’s fine core is a rational
expectations equilibrium allocation; see Corollary 3.4 in Einy et al. (2000).
Our results rely on the assumption that there is a finite number of states of nature. In fact,
when there is an infinite number of states of nature some conceptual problems arise; it is
not clear, for example, how to define the joint information of a coalition.
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